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Abstract
Whether banks through their financial intermediation 
activities (savings mobilization and lending) cause 
economic growth is the theme on which this study was 
based. Data on gross domestic product (GDP), credit 
to private sector (CPS) and total bank deposit (DPS) 
were obtained from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
statistical bulletin and used to compute savings ratio 
(SR) and credit ratio (CPR). A time frame of 1980-2008 
was adopted. The hypotheses that no causal relationship 
exist between savings mobilization and credit on one 
hand and economic growth on the other were tested. The 
Granger Causality Test was used to test these hypotheses. 
It could not identify any significant causal relationship 
between banks’ savings/credit and economic growth. 
The absence of such a relationship was conjectured to be 
due to the economies developmental stage characterized 
by infrastructural decay and the inefficient utilization of 
mobilized deposits. The study therefore recommended 
improvement in infrastructure such as roads and power 
supply. It also suggested close regulatory monitoring to 
ensure that mobilized deposits are used mainly in funding 
the productive sector.
Key words: Financial intermediation; Economic 
growth; Savings; Credit; Liberalization
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INTRODUCTION
In performing their intermediation function, banks 
mobilize savings from the surplus economic unit for 
on-lending to the deficit economic unit. It has been 
argued that by virtue of this function that banks generate 
economic growth by providing needed resources for real 
investment (Shaw, 1973; McKinnon, 1973). It is this line 
of thinking that led to the acceptance and implementation 
of financial liberalization by many developing economies.
Inspite of the popularity liberalization and similar 
policies have enjoyed, economists remain divided in their 
opinions concerning the relationship between financial 
institutions and economic growth. An investigation into 
the different sheds of opinions in this regard reveals a 
long and contentious history. Bagehot (1873) and Hicks 
(1969) argued that the financial system played a critical 
role in igniting industrialization in England by facilitating 
the mobilization of capital. In line with this thinking, 
Schumpeter (1934) contends that well-functioning 
banks spur technological innovations by identifying and 
funding entrepreneurs assessed to have brighter chances 
of successfully implementing innovative products and 
production processes. Several empirical studies support 
the position that financial factors play important role in 
economic growth. They categorically state that a first-
order relationship exists between financial development 
and economic growth (Gerschenkron, 1962; McKinnon, 
1973; Shaw, 1973; King & Levine, 1993a&b, Levine, 
1997; Montiel, 2003).
There are others that view finance–growth relationship 
as unimportant, for example, Lucas (1988) asserted 
that economists “badly over-stress” the role of financial 
factors in economic growth. Beyond this middle position 
are several economists who hold that finance plays no 
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role in economic growth. Robinson (1952) stressed this 
point by stating that “where enterprise leads finance 
follows”. In this view, economic growth creates demand 
for particular types of financial arrangements and the 
financial system responds automatically to these demands. 
This school of thought holds that the financial system is 
an inconsequential side show, responding passively to 
economic growth and industrialization. (Dornbusch and 
Reynoso, 1989; Stiglitz, 1994 & 2000).
Empirically, they argue that the results obtained using 
a financial development indicator as a regressor and 
achieving a statistically positive coefficient in the equation 
of economic growth have been interpreted to confirm the 
theory that financial development promotes economic 
growth. They fault this conclusion as failing to distinguish 
between statistical association and causation. They further 
hold that evidence of a significant positive correlation 
is also consistent with Robinson’s opinion that financial 
development follows economic growth (Abu-Baden and 
Abu-Qarn, 2005).
Considering the important growth role ascribed to 
banks in many developing countries including Nigeria, the 
dissenting views that banks do not cause economic growth 
cannot be overlooked. That is why this study investigates 
the causal link between financial intermediation activities 
of banks and economic growth.
To achieve this objective, this paper is divided into the 
following sections; introduction, theoretical framework, 
methodology, data analysis and interpretation of results, 
conclusion and recommendations.
1.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1.1  The Concept of Financial Intermediation
In human societies since the evolution of money, there 
have always existed those who possess money in excess of 
their immediate needs (surplus economic unit) and those 
whose current possessions cannot finance their economic 
activities (deficit economic unit). The realization by 
the surplus economic unit, that their excess can be used 
beneficially to meet the shortfall experienced by the deficit 
economic unit led to the introduction of a credit system. 
This system was initially characterized by lenders (surplus 
unit) and borrowers (deficit unit) having to search out 
themselves and deal directly, a process known as direct 
financing (Akpan, 2009; Akpanuko and Acha, 2010). This 
process is illustrated below;
                                          
                                          Funds lent
      Households/Firms                                 Firms/Households     
   (Deficit economic unit)                       (Surplus economic unit)
                        Financial claim (loan repayment)
Source: Adapted from Buckle & Thompson (1998), p.15
Figure 1 
Direct Financing
As economies expanded and the needs of the deficit 
economic unit grew, the inadequacies of the system 
of direct financing became obvious. Some of the 
shortcomings of direct financing as identified by Buckle 
and Thompson (1998) are;
i.   Different requirements by lenders and borrowers
ii.  Transaction costs
iii. Problems arising out of information asymmetries. 
Expanding this strand of reasoning, it can be shown 
that while lenders generally want to hold assets which 
have low risk and are liquid, borrowers will want to repay 
the borrowing over the expected life of the investment. 
In addition, this extended time and the nature of the 
business could increase the risk of default. In other words, 
the lender wants a low risk short term asset while the 
borrower is interested in the acquisition of a long term 
liability, which is inherently risky.
Compounding the dilemma of lenders and borrowers 
are transaction costs which makes it difficult for potential 
lenders to find appropriate borrowers. The main forms of 
transaction costs are;
i.   Search costs
ii.  Verification costs
iii. Monitoring costs
iv.  Enforcement costs
In the absence of intermediaries both lenders and 
borrowers will incur costs searching for and finding 
suitable counterparties. It will be difficult for instance 
to find a counterparty with the exact requirements of the 
other party with regard to loan size and maturity. In the 
course of the interaction leading to the loan contract, 
the borrower will make representations to convince, 
the lender to lend. The verification of such information 
made available by the borrower could be costly. On the 
other hand not verifying it could even be more expensive 
as it could lead to total loss of the loan through default 
assuming the unverified information is wrong. The cost of 
lending on the lender does not end with the disbursement 
of the loan but continues until repayment is made. The 
lender hence incurs monitoring costs to ensure that the 
loan is not misapplied and that payment dates are not 
missed. Also, the lender needs to enforce the terms of the 
contract and take steps to recover debt when repayment is 
in arrears. This gives rise to enforcement costs (Benston& 
Smith, 1976).
Another key problem faced by direct financing is 
that arising from asymmetric information. Usually, the 
borrower has more information about the potential returns 
and risks of the investment project for which funds are 
borrowed compared to the lender. This creates problems 
for the lender, both before the loan is made, at the 
verification stage, and after, at the monitoring/enforcement 
stages. When the lender is verifying borrowers, borrowers 
who are likely to default may be selected. This is 
known as adverse selection. Also, after the loan is made 
(monitoring/enforcement stages), there is the possibility 
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that the borrower could engage in undesirable activities. 
That is activities that will increase the likelihood of 
default. This is known as moral hazard and could manifest 
in the borrower engaging in riskier activities than would 
have been engaged in if personal funds were invested. 
Indirect financing, also known as financial intermediation, 
therefore evolved to address these observed flaws in direct 
financing.
1.2  The Process of Financial Intermediation   
Financial intermediation is “a process which involves 
surplus units depositing money with financial institutions 
which then lend to deficit units” (Mathews & Thompson, 
2008). In other words, financial intermediation is a system 
of channeling funds from lenders (surplus economic unit) 
to borrowers (deficit economic unit) through financial 
institutions. From the above view, financial institutions 
exist to broker the relationship between lenders and 
borrowers. They intervene to smoothen the flaws of 
direct finance. With financial intermediaries, lenders and 
borrowers need no longer transact directly as financial 
institutions act as a link between these units.
              Funds lent (Deposits)              Funds lent (Credit)
    Households/Firms            Financial                Firms/Households       
    (Surplus unit)            intermediary (Bank)         (Deficit unit)
Financial claim                                                       Financial claim 
(Loan repayment)                                              (Deposit withdrawal)
Source: Adapted from Buckle & Thompson (1998) p.15.
Figure 2
Indirect Financing/Financial Intermediation
The process depicted in figure2 indicates that 
households instead of lending directly to firms, as in 
the case of direct financing deposit their excesses with 
a financial intermediary. This financial intermediary 
aggregates deposits from various households for on-
lending to the deficit unit. The repayment of the loan 
is made to the intermediary, which also stands ready to 
redeem deposit withdrawals by the surplus unit. Mathews 
and Thompson (2008) identified four criteria that 
distinguish financial intermediaries especially banks from 
other financial institutions, these are;
i. their main category of liabilities (deposits) 
are specified for a fixed sum which is not related to the 
performance of the portfolio
ii. the deposits are typically short-term and of a 
more shorter term than their assets 
iii. a  high proportion of their  l iabil i t ies are 
chequeable (can be withdrawn on demand) 
iv. their liabilities and assets are largely not 
transferable. 
It is these characteristics of financial intermediaries 
that enable them reduce or eliminate the problems 
associated with direct financing.
1.3  Financial Intermediaries and Problems of 
Direct Financing
The first problem which we identified is the difference 
in the requirement of lenders and borrowers. It was 
noted that while lenders want low risk liquid assets, 
borrowers are interested in long-term liabilities. Financial 
intermediaries resolve this problem through their asset 
transformation function. This, they do by transforming 
large denominations of financial assets into smaller units. 
They are also able to transform the characteristics of the 
funds that pass through them. This it does by mismatching 
the maturity of the assets it holds with the maturity of the 
liabilities it issues. They borrow funds that are short-term 
(deposits) and lend them with long-term maturity (loans). 
Thus, a financial intermediary is able to hold high-risk, 
long-term claims issued by borrowers and finance this 
by issuing low-risk and short-term deposits. This is a 
process known as qualitative asset transformation (QAT) 
(Bhattacharya &Thakor, 1993; Mishkin& Eakins, 1998; 
Buckle & Thompson, 1998 and Saunders & Cornett, 
2006). Diamond and Dybvig (1983) confirm this by 
opining that “…banks provide better risk sharing among 
agents who need to consume at different (random) 
times”. This liquidity to them provides the rationale 
for the existence of banks and by extension financial 
intermediation.
Financial intermediaries address the risks associated 
with maturity transformation by diversifying funding 
sources. On the other hand, risk associated with 
transformation of default risk can be reduced by obtaining 
information on potential borrowers and selecting those 
that have the highest repayment potentials. In this regard, 
Buckle & Thompson point out that banks have advantage 
over direct lender in obtaining useful information on 
potential borrowers since most of these borrowers use 
banks’ payment services.
Transaction costs were also cited as one of the 
problems that the existence of financial intermediaries 
solves. Mathews and Thompson (2008) explain that 
intermediaries are able to reduce search costs through their 
distribution channels. By spreading out their branches and 
adopting products like automated teller machine (ATM), 
internet banking and telephone banking, intermediaries 
reduce search costs by borrowers. Furthermore, Allen 
and Santomero (1977) point out that, intermediaries also 
reduce verification costs by developing expertise in certain 
business lines. In-depth knowledge of client and their 
businesses by intermediaries make verification quicker, 
more effective and cheaper. Monitoring a borrower 
refers to “information collection before and after a loan 
is granted”, including screening of loan applications, 
examining the borrowers ongoing credit worthiness and 
ensuring that the borrower adheres to the terms of the 
contract. This implies enormous costs in monitoring and 
enforcement. Since banks’ possess privileged information 
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regarding the borrowers’ current account and can observe 
the flows of income and expenditure, these costs can be 
ameliorated (Diamond, 1984; Mathews & Thompson, 
2008). Diamond (1996) further buttresses this point by 
stating that: 
The means by which banks are able to perform as delegated 
monitors and to transform loans that require costly monitoring 
into deposits that do not, depend crucially on the use of portfolio 
diversified across independent loans with expected repayments 
in excess of the value of deposits, then the probability of the 
bank defaulting on its deposits approaches zero. This theory 
shows that diversifying the loan portfolio enables low-cost 
delegated monitoring.
The third and final problem of direct financing 
giving rise to the need for intermediaries is information 
asymmetry. The information asymmetry problem arises 
because borrowers usually possess insider information 
about investment projects that lenders may be unaware 
of. According to Claus and Grimes (2003) information 
asymmetry can occur “ex ante” or “ex post”. It is ex ante 
when lenders can not differentiate between borrowers 
with different credit risks before providing loans leading 
to adverse selection problem. On the other hand, ex post 
information asymmetry arises when only borrowers, 
but not lenders, can observe actual returns after project 
completion. This gives rise to moral hazard problems, 
where borrowers engage in activities that increase 
the likelihood of default. To resolve these problems, 
information is needed. Unfortunately information is a 
“public good”. Even when privately produced at great 
cost there is a tendency that other agents could access 
it at lower costs. That is the “free rider problem”. 
This discourages the direct financier from investing in 
“publicly optimal information” (Hirschleifer& Riley, 
1979). Financial intermediaries, on the other hand, 
can obtain information at lower cost than individual 
lenders because they avoid duplication in production 
of information. Leland and Pyle (1977) buttress this by 
showing that banks can communicate information to 
investors about potential borrowers at lower cost than 
can individual borrowers. To mitigate the moral hazard 
problem, banks introduce restrictive covenants which 
restrict the borrowers’ activity and increase the probability 
of repayment. It can also be said to encourage borrowers 
to undertake desirable behaviour, for example, mortgage 
loans requiring the borrower to obtain life assurance 
(Buckle & Thompson, 2008).
2.  METHODOLOGY
The study uses data obtained from the Central Bank of 
Nigeria. The time frame of 1980-2008 was adopted. Data 
used include those of gross domestic product (GDP) from 
which the gross domestic product growth rate (GDPG), 
which served as a proxy for economic growth was 
computed. Others include, savings ratio (SR) obtained by 
indexing bank deposit (DPS) by GDP. On the credit side 
bank’s credit to the private sector (CPS) was indexed by 
total bank credit (TBC) to obtain the credit ratio (CPR). 
Two models (equations 1a&b and 2a&b) were developed, 
which were used to test the direction of causality between 
savings and economic growth and between credit and 
economic growth respectively.
2.1  The Direction of Causality Between Bank 
Intermediation and Economic Growth
Using deposit as intermediation proxy
GDPG =ao+ a1GDPGt-1 + a2 SRt-1 + et………………...…1a
SR =bo+ b1SRt-1 + b2GDPGt-1 + et…………………....….1b
Where:
GDPGt-1 = Lagged GDPG
SRt-1 = Lagged savings ratio 
Using Credit as intermediation proxy
GDPG= ao+ a1GDPGt-1+a2CPRt-1+et……………….....…2a
LLTBC= bo+ b1CPRt-1 + b2GDPGt-1 + et…………...........2b
Where:
GDPGt-1 = Lagged GDPG
CPRt-1 = Lagged ratio of credit to private to total bank 
credit
2.2  Analytical Procedure
To determine the direction of causality, the Granger 
causality test is adopted. The hypotheses for the Granger 
test are as follows:
H0: X does not Granger cause Y
HI: X does Granger cause Y
H0: Y does not Granger cause X
HI: Y does Granger cause X
The Granger causality test is based on the following 
bivariate model: 
                                             ………………...........…3a
                                             ………………...........…3b
In conducting the Granger causality test ,  the 
econometric software Eviews 5.0 is used.
3.   DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
OF RESULT
Table 1
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests   
   
Null Hypothesis:                             Obs    F-Statistic   Probabilit 
     
SR does not Granger Cause GDPG      27      0.37803      0.54445
GDPG does not Granger Cause SR       0.01174      0.91462
     
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 12/18/10   Time: 16:39
Sample: 1980 2008 
Lags: 1  
   To be continued
Yt = a10 a1j
j = 1
k
/ Yt- j + b1j
j = 1
k
/ xt- j + ut
xt = a20 a2j
j = 1
k
/ xt- j + b2j
j = 1
k
/ Yt- j + ut
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Continued
Null Hypothesis:                             Obs    F-Statistic   Probability
      
CPR does not Granger Cause GDPG   27        0.06464       0.80147
GDPG does not Granger Cause CPR        0.00034       0.98536
   
Source: Author’s computation using Eviews 5.0 software
The results of the Granger Causality test indicate that 
the hypotheses, financial intermediation does not Granger 
cause economic growth and that economic growth does 
not Granger cause financial intermediation, cannot be 
rejected. This result was the same for both savings and 
credit as intermediation proxies. Going by the probability 
values of 0.54 and 0.91 for SR and GDPG and 0.80 and 
0.98 for CPR and GDPG, at 5% level of significance all 
the null hypotheses are accepted.
From the above, it can therefore be deduced that 
financial intermediation does not cause economic 
growth neither does economic growth cause financial 
intermediation. This result is quite surprising considering 
the economic growth responsibilities bestowed on banks 
in many developing economies. It also brings to question 
the utilization of the enormous deposit mobilized by banks 
and tends to corroborate the opinion that banks do not 
cause economic development. It can therefore be deduced 
that for developing economies, bank intermediation 
(savings and credit) is not a sufficient economic growth 
condition. It also suggests that other factors such as social 
infrastructure, roads, power supply, economic and political 
stability may play fundamental roles in economic growth 
of such economies.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study was instigated by the economic growth 
function assigned banks in many developing economies 
and strengthened by the lack of consensus among 
experts as to whether banks cause economic growth. The 
study therefore assessed whether banks through their 
intermediation activities cause economic growth. From 
the result of the Granger Causality Test it is deduced that 
from 1980-2008 that the intermediation activities of banks 
were not the cause of the growth in the economy.
This therefore is indicative of the presence of more 
influential economic growth factors, which the study 
conjectured to include social infrastructure, roads, power 
supply, economic and political stability. In the light of the 
above it is suggested that the governments of developing 
economies should pay attention to infrastructural 
development. They should ensure improvement in road 
network, transportation and power supply. They should 
also pay due attention to economic and political stability. 
Considering the fact that a lot of deposit is mobilized by 
banks, the regulatory authorities may begin to show a 
little more than passing interest in what banks use these 
deposits for. The channeling of these deposits to the 
productive sector may bring desired results.
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APPENDIX
DATA SET USED FOR ANALYSIS
YEARS     Total Bank                Real Gross                  Total Bank                    Credit to Private               GDPG         SR*         CPR**
                       Deposit               Domestic Product        Credit(TBC)N’m             Sector(CPS)N’m
                     (DPS)N’m     (GDP)N’m                            
1980       5382.9       31546.8            6349.1                  3795.3                      -          17.1           59.70
1981       6124.1     205222.1            8582.9                  5088.9                   84.6            2.98         59.30
1982       7029.5     199685.3          10275.3                  6003.5                    -2.77            3.52         58.40
1983       8876.6     185598.1          11093.9                  6372.4                    -7.59            4.78         57.40
1984     10361.9     183563.0          11503.6                  6674.9                    -1.11            5.64         58.00
1985     11869.1                     201036.3          12170.2                  7272.2                     8.69            5.90         59.80
1986     13227.4     205971.4          15701.6                  9353.9                     2.40            6.42         59.60
1987     17911.5                     204806.5          17531.9                10527.0                    -0.57            8.75         60.00
1988     22380.0     219875.6          19561.2                12379.9                     6.85          10.20         63.30
1989     21784.0     236739.6          22008.0                13640.5                     7.12            9.20         62.00
1990     27486.5     267550.0          26000.1                15678.3                   11.52          10.30         60.30
1991     35366.7     265379.1          31306.2                20039.0                    -0.82          13.30         64.00
1992     51781.3     271365.5          42736.8                27201.9                     2.21          19.10         63.60
1993     80192.7     274833.3          65665.3                40692.9                     1.26          29.20         61.90
1994     87443.6     275450.6          66127.6                57279.6                     0.22          31.70         86.60
1995   104428.9     281407.4        114883.9                95441.0                     2.12          37.10         83.10
1996   130858.5     293745.4        169437.1              120551.7                     4.204                4.50         71.10
1997   173820.0     302022.5        385550.5              131373.4                     2.74                57.60         34.10
1998   192233.4     310890.1        272895.0              146761.6                     2.85                61.80         53.80
1999   266314                      312183.5      1265984.4              667091.8                     0.41                85.30         52.70
2000   369788.3     329178.7      1795768.3              798395.4                     5.16              112.30         44.50
2001   451963.1     356994.3      2796112.2            1140868.9                     7.79              126.60         40.80
2002   556011.7                     433203.5      3606229.1            1410885.8                   17.60              128.30         39.10
2003   655739.7     477553.0      4339443.0            1569088.7                     9.29              137.30         36.20
2004   797517.2     527576.0      5686669.4            2087749.8                     9.48              151.10         36.70
2005 1316957.4     561931.4      7468655.1            2270961.3                     6.11              234.40         30.40
2006 1739636.9     595821.6      2524297.9              746663.1                     5.69              292.00         44.60
2007 2693554.3     634251.1      4813488.8            1127867.8                     6.06              424.70         23.40
2008 4118172.8                     674889.0      7725818.9            7909783.8                     6.02              610.20         10.90
Source- Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, 2008 and Author’s computation
*SR- DPS/GDP
**CPR- CPS/TBC
Acha, Ikechukwu A(2011). 
International Business and Management, 3(1), 156-161
